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Aesthetic Considerations in Mathematics
Nathalie Sinclair
Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University
nathsinc@sfu.ca

Abstract
Drawing on some of the principles of humanistic mathematics first outlined by
Alvin White, this paper seeks to examine the way in which value judgments are
implicated in the growth of the mathematics discipline. After a short overview
of some of the roles ascribed to the mathematical aesthetic historically, I turn to
more contemporary positioning of the aesthetic in order to develop a framework
that offers insight into the particular values, assumptions and desires that constrain what is done in mathematics, how it is done and why. My goal, at least
in part, is to bring together under one umbrella some of the recent work that
is being done in the cultural ethnography and cognitive history of mathematics
and, in so doing, provide a stronger rationale for the importance and relevance of
aesthetic considerations in the history and philosophy of mathematics. Finally, I
use this framework to promote the idea of a mathematics critic, who could do
for mathematics what art critics do for the arts, namely, to not only evaluate and
explain art, but to work toward establishing its accessibility and credibility.
In the edited collection Essays in Humanistic Mathematics, Alvin M.
White [58] describes the humanistic dimension of mathematics as including
both: “an appreciation of the role of intuition in understanding and creating
concepts” and “An understanding of the value judgments implied in the
growth of any discipline [...] what is investigated, how it is investigated, or
why it is investigated” (vii). For me, both these aspects relate strongly to the
mathematical aesthetic in two ways. First, in writing about the importance of
the value judgments made in the discipline, White points to the axiological
dimension of the philosophy of mathematics, which include both aesthetic
and ethical questions of what is beautiful or ugly, good or bad, and why.
Second, in pointing to the role of intuition in understanding and creating
concepts, I interpret White as being concerned with the informal and nonpropositional ways in which mathematical ideas derive their meaning, which
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are deeply embodied – and thus aesthetic in the etymological sense of the
Ancient Greek word αὶσθητικὸς (“of sense perception”), which in turn comes
from αὶσθάνομαι (“I feel”).
Aesthetic considerations have not featured strongly in the Western philosophy of mathematics tradition, which tends to focus more on issues of
epistemology and ontology, and which tends to treat the aesthetic as epiphenomenal, overly vague, or even frivolous. By casting the aesthetic in this
way, few undertake to study it seriously, which – as I will argue –allows
the aesthetic to operate in somewhat covert ways within the mathematical
community, and even the broader areas of society impacted by the discipline. Despite its marginal position in the philosophy of mathematics, and
its largely unexamined use in the discourse of the mathematics community,
I wish to offer a compelling evidence for its fundamental role in defining
the very nature of the discipline, in guiding its growth, and in mediating its
teaching.
I will begin with a short overview of the various ways in which the construct of aesthetics has been taken up in relation to mathematics. Then,
drawing on more contemporary positioning of the aesthetic – especially in
relation to the epistemic – I will offer a framework for thinking about the
aesthetic in mathematics that is consistent with its use in other disciplines,
especially the arts, one that offers productive ways of gaining insight into
the particular values, assumptions and desires that constrain what is done
in mathematics, how it is done and why. My goal, at least in part, is to
bring together under one umbrella some of the recent work that is being
done in the cultural ethnography and cognitive history of mathematics and,
hopefully, to show that this work it worth doing, not least for the fact that
the values, assumptions and desires that have shaped mathematics today
have a tremendous affect on society. In the final section I will look more
closely at how aesthetic considerations are taken up in the literature about
and around mathematicians, and, in particular, I will examine the possibility
of the mathematics critic who might play a role similar to that played by arts
critics.
1. Mathematicians’ conception of aesthetics
Though the use of words such as “beautiful” and “elegant” to talk about
the mathematical strikes many non-mathematicians as rather odd, this discourse is prevalent in the mathematical community and even at the com-
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munity’s outer edges in textbooks and popularizing non-fiction books. A
substantial part of the early writing on the mathematical aesthetic focused
on exploring the aesthetic merits of mathematical products, especially proofs
and theorems. Mathematicians such as G.H. Hardy attempted to offer criteria by which one could judge aesthetic merit, taking a rather objective view
that aesthetic merit was independent of the observer and intrinsic to the
mathematical product itself – a view that was mainstream in the philosophy
of arts even at the turn of the last century (in the work, for example, of
Roger Fry and Cleve Bell). In A Mathematician’s Apology, Hardy [17] emphasizes criteria such as depth and significance, as well as “purely aesthetic
qualities” such as unexpectedness, inevitability and economy. He famously
claimed that “the mathematician’s patterns, like the painter’s or the poet’s,
must be beautiful; the ideas, like the colors or the words must fit together in
a harmonious way” and that “there is no permanent place in this world for
ugly mathematics.” (p.85). In a similar vein, in terms of objective criteria of
finished products, King [24], in an attempt to distinguish “good” mathematics from “bad” (to save the world from “bad” mathematics?) proposed two
definitive criteria: the principle of minimal completeness and the principle of
maximal applicability.
The pursuit of objective criteria did not receive a great deal of attention in the mathematics community and, by the early 1990s – when serious
philosophers of art had long ago abandoned this viewpoint – David Wells ran
a survey in the Mathematics Intelligencer showing that the aesthetic metric of mathematical theorems was highly subjective. In the large number of
responses he received, from eminent mathematicians around the world, who
were asked to rate the beauty of twenty-two theorems, Wells [57] found that
many factors were at play in evaluating the aesthetic merit of these theorems:
field of interest; preferences for certain mathematical entities such as problems, proofs or theorems; past experiences or associations with particular
theorems; even mood. He also points out that aesthetic judgments change
over time: this was particularly evident in the rating of Euler’s formula,1
which was historically considered “the most beautiful formula of mathemat1

Euler’s formula (V − E + F = 2) has, in a sense, turned into an object in modern
mathematics, namely, the Euler characteristic (of a surface). This object might have had
more aesthetic merit for the mathematicians surveyed; nonetheless, as I will discuss later,
the transition to object itself may be seen as part of ways of doing mathematics that are
worth aesthetic consideration.
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ics” (p.38), but is now, according to Wells’s respondents at least, considered
too obvious even to elicit an aesthetic response.
The inferences made by Wells correspond to a contextualist view of aesthetic appreciation and are summed up by this respondent: “beauty, even in
mathematics, depends upon historical and cultural contexts, and therefore
tends to elude numerical interpretation” (p.39). Indeed, the history of mathematics shows how new mathematical ideas often inspire negative aesthetic
responses before they become accepted within the community, and even
judged in positive aesthetic terms. For example, Charles Hermite, recoils
with “dread” and “horror” from non-differentiable but continuous functions,
writing: “Je me détourne avec effroi et horreur de cette plaie lamentable des
fonctions continues qui n’ont pas de dérivés” (I turn in dread and horror from
this lamentable sore of continuous functions that do not have derivatives) [3,
p.318]. Similar trajectories are well-known in response to, for example, the
work of Cantor and to the development of non-Euclidean geometry. Initial negative aesthetic judgments (“ugly” or “bad”) reveal themselves in the
very mathematical words themselves, such as irrational numbers, complex
numbers, the monster group, or annihilators.
Acknowledging the fact that different mathematicians will find different
results beautiful or elegant, depending on historical, cultural and personal
contexts does not address the question of whether aesthetic judgments play
a role in the development of mathematical knowledge. But this more functional view of the aesthetic was developed very strongly by the French mathematician Henri Poincaré [39], who examined the process of mathematical
discovery, including its intuitive aspects. Poincaré drew particular attention to the aesthetic responses that allow a mathematician subconsciously
to distinguish beautiful ideas that will lead to productive results from ugly
ones that will lead nowheresuggesting that in some sense beautiful ideas are
precisely those that lead to productive results. Poincaré tried to show that
mathematical invention depends upon the often subconscious choice and selection of “beautiful” combinations of ideas, those best able to “charm this
special sensibility that all mathematicians know” (p.2048).
In his book titled The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field,
Jacques Hadamard [15] proposes the first expansion of Poincaré’s aesthetic
heuristic theory, additionally claiming that aesthetic sensibilities often guide
a mathematician’s general choices about which line of investigation to pursue. He writes specifically about the “sense of beauty” (p.130) informing the
mathematician that “such a direction of investigation is worth following; we
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feel that the question in itself deserves interest” (p.127; italics in original ).
Hadamard also adds to Poincaré’s ideas on the role of the mathematical preconscious in mathematical thinking, locating the period in which it is most
operative – the incubation period – within a larger theory of mathematical
inquiry. In contrast to mathematicians such as Hardy, who were focused
on the question of aesthetic merit, both Poincaré and Hadamard were more
interested in the pragmatic concerns of how aesthetic responses shape and
propel mathematical investigation.
Following in the tradition of Poincaré and Hadamard, Morris Kline [25]
points out that aesthetic concerns not only guide the direction of an investigation, but motivate the search for new proofs of theorems already correctly
established but lacking in aesthetic appeal – by means of their ability to
“woo and charm the intellect” (p.470) of the mathematician. Kline takes
this aesthetic motivation as a definitive sign of the artistic nature of mathematics. Similarly, in his attempt to define mathematics as the “classification
and study of all possible patterns” (p.12), Warwick Sawyer [45] implies that
the heuristic value of mathematical beauty stems from mathematicians sensitivity to pattern and originates in their belief that “where there is pattern
there is significance” (p.36; italics in original ). Sawyer goes on to explain
the heuristic value of this trust in pattern:
If in a mathematical work of any kind we find that a certain
striking pattern recurs, it is always suggested that we should investigate why it occurs. It is bound to have some meaning, which
we can grasp as an idea rather than as a collection of symbols.
(p.36; italics in original )
Sawyer might well have explained Poincaré’s special aesthetic sensibility as
a sensibility toward pattern, viewed broadly as any regularity that can be
recognised by the mind. For him, the mathematician is not only able to
recognise regularities and symmetries, but is also attuned to look for and
respond to them with further investigation.
Several decades later, the philosopher Harold Osborne [35] observes: “the
reliance on the heuristic value of mathematical beauty in scientific theory
has become something of a commonplace” (p.291). This indicates the extent to which scientists had placed their trust in Poincaré’s notion of the
mathematical aesthetic sensibility as a kind of muse who, if listened to carefully, would both guide and inspire creativity. In fact, scientists have been
much more prolific than mathematicians in cataloguing and inspecting the
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effect of this trust on the development of scientific theories (see, for example,
[8, 11, 14, 31, 56]).
Drawing on pragmatic concern for the role of the aesthetic in mathematics
and on interview with contemporary mathematicians, I (see [46, 47]) have
identified three distinct roles the aesthetic plays in mathematical inquiry –
where I use the term “aesthetic” to designate judgements of value. The most
recognized and public of the three roles of the aesthetic is the evaluative;
it concerns the aesthetic nature of mathematical entities and is involved
in judgments about the beauty, elegance, and significance of entities such
as proofs and theorems. The generative role of the aesthetic is a guiding
one and involves nonpropositional modes of reasoning used in the process
of inquiry and that is often expressed through affective responses to felt
patterns. Lastly, the motivational role refers to the aesthetic responses that
attract mathematicians to (or repel them from) certain problems or certain
fields of mathematics.2
While some may acknowledge the validity of these three roles, they may
still take issue with Wolfgang Krull’s claim that aesthetic concerns may even
surpass epistemic ones for mathematicians:
Mathematicians are not concerned merely with finding and proving theorems, they also want to arrange and assemble the theorems so that they appear not only correct but evident and compelling. Such a goal, I feel, is aesthetic rather than epistemological. [26, p.49]
Krull’s statement invites some consideration of the difference between the
aesthetic and the epistemic. Scholars such as Dewey [12] have called into
question the strict distinction between the two domains; indeed, in his Art
as Experience, where he tries to carve out a place for the aesthetic as a theme
in human experience (and not just as an esoteric practice of high art), Dewey
seeks to integrate the aesthetic with the cognitive and the affective as insep2

More recently, Jullien [23] has proposed a more semiotic approach to the issue of the
mathematical aesthetic, drawing on Nelson Goodman’s work. Instead of focusing on the
aesthetic merit of mathematical products, or on the aesthetic dimension of mathematical
discovery, Jullien shifts attention to the question of aesthetic functioning. Parallel to the
change in questioning involved in the arts – from “what is art?” to “when is it art?” –
Jullien asks when mathematics functions aesthetically, drawing together both cognitive
and emotional components.
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arable aspects of experience. In a somewhat similar vein, Michael Polanyi’s
[40] groundbreaking “post-critical” examination of the non-explicit dimension of scientific knowledge, argues that mathematical knowledge cannot be
divorced from personal and communal values and commitments. Other scholars such as Robert Root-Bernstein [41] and Judith Wechsler [56] have also
emphasized the cognitive dimension of the aesthetic by framing it as a particular way of knowing that is both used and useful in the sciences as well as
the arts.
Other scholars wish to retain a sharper distinction between the aesthetic
and the epistemic. For example, Todd [53] retains a strict distinction between
the two and argues that all purported aesthetic judgments in mathematics
are, in fact, “masked epistemic assessments” (p.61). Todd thereby questions
the actual role of the aesthetic in mathematics, claiming that nothing is ever
accepted as truth on purely aesthetic grounds. Evidently, the question of
whether or not the aesthetic plays an important role in mathematics depends
on how one defines and distinguishes the epistemic and aesthetic. However,
one problem with Todd’s argument involves his strict focus on the status
of mathematical results as objective entities void of cultural and historical
dimensions. In other words, what counts as “true” and the ways in which
such truths are communicated in the discipline is contingent on the norms
and values of the discipline, which cannot be developed through cognitive or
epistemic means alone.
2. Aesthetic values in the mathematics discourse
Instead of focusing on the distinction between the cognitive and the aesthetic as ways of knowing, Pimm [37] proposes a framing of the aesthetic
dimension of mathematics in a way that resembles the aesthetic dimension
of art. For Pimm, aesthetic considerations “concern what to attend to (the
problems, elements, objects), how to attend to them (the means, principles,
techniques, methods) and why they are worth attending to (in pursuit of
the beautiful, the good, the right, the useful, the ideal, the perfect or, simply, the true)” (p.160). The reader will likely notice strong parallels with
White’s conception of the humanistic dimension of mathematics. Pimm’s
framing offers an avenue of inquiry that shifts attention from the modes of
mathematical inquiry of individual mathematicians, as in Sinclair’s tripartite
model, to the practices of the community as a whole, including how truths
are named, manipulated and negotiated.
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One potential drawback of Pimm’s framing is that it becomes overly
broad. However, this can be rectified by parametrizing its scope to what the
historian of mathematics Leo Corry [9, 10] calls the “images” of mathematics. In contrast to the “body” of mathematics, which includes “questions
directly related to the subject matter of any given mathematical discipline:
theorems, proofs, techniques, open problem,” the images of mathematics “refer to, and help elucidating, questions arising from the body of knowledge
but which in general are not part of, and cannot be settled within, the body
of knowledge itself” (p.135). Thus, while the body of mathematics might
concern itself with describing a technique used in the course of a proof, the
images of mathematics refer to the motivations, choices and values related to
the use of certain techniques. While the body of mathematics concerns itself
with defining objects, the image of mathematics questions which objects are
defined and which are not. Corry contends that mathematicians do not customarily write about their images. However, I would argue that historians
and philosophers of mathematics do attend to the images of mathematics;
the perennial philosophical question of whether mathematical objects exist
cannot be settled within the body of mathematics, but certainly refers to the
body and may help elucidate aspects of mathematical practice.
While some historical and philosophical inquiries do not have an axiological focus, I see the images of mathematics as being a layer of mathematical
knowledge that very frequently involve aesthetic considerations. So, while a
historical inquiry into the origins of the calculus may have little to do with
aesthetics, it can provide insight into the values and preferences that were
operative in the 17th century mathematics that led to Leibniz’s algebraic
approach winning over Newton’s geometric one. I will be interested in examining the images of mathematics as they relate to aesthetic considerations,
which I will explore in terms of Pimm’s three categories. I take the humanist
view that mathematics changes in time and place, and that discussions of the
images of mathematics will necessarily shift. Instead of looking at the discussions in a chronological way, I will be categorizing them according to Pimm’s
framing. My aim is not to provide a portrait of the images of mathematics today, but rather, to show how discussions of the images of mathematics (from
different philosophical perspectives, historical periods, and personal experiences) involve aesthetic considerations. In so doing, I want to broaden the
notion of aesthetics beyond simple assertions about the prettiness, beauty or
elegance or particular artifacts that individual mathematicians may (or may
not) agree with.
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2.1. WHY do mathematicians attend?
I’d like to begin with the question of why mathematicians prove theorems
that have already been proven: in other words, why are existing truths worth
attending to? The question relates to Krull’s assertion, in the quotation
at the end of Section 1, that mathematicians are not concerned only with
finding, having or creating knowledge, but also with the way in which that
knowledge may be made more or less evident and compelling.
A century prior to Krull, the mathematician C.F. Gauss also discussed
the practice of seeking new proofs of existing results in the context of having
produced six different proofs of the law of quadratic reciprocity:
As soon as a new result is discovered by induction, one must
consider as the first requirement the finding of a proof by any
possible means. But after such good fortune, one must not in
higher arithmetic consider the investigation closed or view the
search for other proofs as a superfluous luxury. For sometimes one
does not at first come upon the most beautiful and simplest proof,
and then it is just the insight into the wonderful concatenation
of truth in higher arithmetic that is the chief attraction for study
and often leads to the discovery of new truths. For these reasons
the finding of new proofs for known truths is often at least as
important as the discovery itself. (Gauss, 1863, pp.159–160; in
[30, p.299])
Gauss seems to be defending the motivations of his own mathematical
pursuit by insisting that they are not a “superfluous luxury.” His defense
involves championing the worthiness of “most beautiful and simplest” proofs.
The aesthetic dimension here is easy to see since the “why” question is in
pursuit of the beautiful. Gauss then goes on to describe the “chief attraction
for study” as being the “insight into the wonderful concatenation of truth.”
For Gauss, it is the relation between truths that propels the study of higher
arithmetic.
The contemporary mathematician Gian-Carlo Rota [42] offers a somewhat different reason for finding new proofs, namely, that when a new theorem is discovered, its proof is usually overly complicated. Rota believes that
simpler proofs of a theorem, which may take decades or even centuries to
find, gradually bring out the significance of a new discovery. For Rota, these
are the “definitive” proofs of theorems. Rota’s answer to the “why” question is that mathematicians find new proofs in order to find the “definitive”
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proof that achieves understanding. As with Gauss, Rota acknowledges that
new proofs are not sought for the sake of “truth,” which the first proof of a
theorem would establish.
The philosopher of mathematics Carlo Cellucci [7] criticizes Rota’s view
of the definitive proof on several counts: first, sometimes new proofs do not
lead to improved understanding of the old proofs since they are based on
different ideas; second, new proofs are still created even when a theorem has
been well understood. Indeed, the question of when a proof is well understood
begs the question of well understood for whom. Instead, Cellucci argues that
the main reason for new proofs is their heuristic value, which “consists in
the discovery of hypotheses which not only allow one to prove the result,
but also establish connections between different areas of mathematics, where
such connections may lead to new discoveries.”
As a phenomenologist, Rota may not have found Cellucci’s criticism compelling: after all, Rota is interested in his own experience of doing mathematics and, thus, his own reasons for seeing the value in new proofs. But we
may distinguish between the personal experience of mathematicians (finding
the definitive proof, or seeing the concatenation of truths) and the sanctioned
practice of the mathematics discipline. Personal pleasures may well motivate
the work of the individual mathematician, but why would a new proof of a
known result be published in a journal?
Consider for example Apostol’s [2] geometric proof of the irrationality
of the square root of two, which was published in the Notes section of the
American Mathematical Monthly, and is presented as a “remarkably simple
proof [...] that is a variation of the classical Greek geometric proof” (p.841).
The proof is certainly not definitive, and thus fails Rota’s criterion for seeking
new proofs. The mathematician Jonathan Borwein [5] says that the proof
is “lovely because it offers new insight into a result that was first proven
over two thousand years ago. It is also verges on being a ‘proof without
words’” (p.44). Borwein thus offers “new insight” as the criterion for the
proof’s aesthetic appeal, in addition to the proof’s ability to stand on its
own, as it were, without too many words. In terms of the former, the “new
insight” doesn’t seem to overlap exactly with Cellucci’s sense of heuristic
value, in part because the tools for assembling this proof have been available
for over two millennia (which, for me, lends the proof a surprising quality).
I find the latter part of Borwein’s statement similar to Gauss’s idea of the
concatenation of truths in the sense that a geometric argument (and diagram)
is being used to make an arithmetic claim, which can be seen as a semiotic
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concatenation.
While Borwein offers criteria for why the new proof is lovely, the only
official comment on it, which acts as a de facto explanation for why it is
being published, is that it is “remarkably simple.” Of course, there is a wide
gulf between this stark assessment of the proof and the kinds of emotional
experiences that can be glimpsed in the writings of mathematicians such as
Le Lionnais [28] and Poincaré. Indeed, Rota [42] draws attention to the
way in which aesthetic descriptors used by mathematicians, which are often
interpreted to be judgments of “good” mathematics, may in fact represent
veiled ways of communicating the emotional dimension of their mathematical
experiences:
Mathematical beauty is the expression mathematicians have invented in order to obliquely admit the phenomenon of enlightenment while avoiding acknowledgement of the fuzziness of this
phenomenon. [...] This copout is one step in a cherished activity
of mathematicians, that of building a perfect world immune to
the messiness of the ordinary world, a world where what we think
should be true turns out to be true, a world that is free from the
disappointments, the ambiguities, the failures of that other world
in which we live. (pp.132–133; italics in original )
Rota draws attention to the particular types of pleasures motivating the
mathematician – and they are not just that of solving a very difficult problem.
The pleasures are connected to the way in which these solutions are “perfect,”
“immune to the messiness of the ordinary world,” free of ambiguity and
disappointment.
Rota seems to be pointing to the way in which the body of mathematics
admits discussions of “good mathematics” as long as they remain objective
and that in order to elucidate the question of what makes good mathematics
(or what makes it worth publishing a new proof of an existing result) one
must consider the emotional dimension of mathematical experience. In this
sense, Apostol (or the editors of the American Mathematical Monthly) are
counting on the fact that readers of the new proof will also experience the
phenomenon of enlightenment (which Gauss also alluded to). This goal seems
not very different from the goal of the artist, which is to offer for the viewer
a transformative experience. The difference is that the artist, in general, is
willing to admit it, and thus does not need the kind of “copout” to which
Rota refers. Even Cellucci can be seen as offering a copout, staying close as
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he does to the rather clinical term “heuristic value,” which manages to skirt
the emotional.
In this section, I have focused on a very specific practice in mathematics,
that of finding new proofs for existing results. I chose it because the goals
for such a practice are clearly not purely epistemological (in the sense that
the truth of the theorem has already been established). This practice can be
analysed both in terms of the variety of aesthetic responses that individual
mathematical have had (which do not always agree) and in terms of the
function of such a practice in the community. While the function may very
well be, as Cellucci argues, primarily intended to add heuristic value, Rota’s
“copout” suggests that it is not so clearly utilitarian.
The question of why mathematicians re-prove existing results could be
broadened to that of why mathematicians prove at all. Rota’s comments
would apply just as well. However, while Rota focuses on one’s own understanding, the contemporary mathematician William Thurston [52] draws
attention to the value of socially-shared understanding:
We are not trying to meet some abstract production quota of
definitions, theorems and proofs. The measure of our success is
whether what we do enables people to understand and think more
clearly and effectively about mathematics. (p.3)
Using the proof of the Four Colour Theorem and its ensuing controversy as
an example, Thurston insists that both the veracity of the theorem and the
correctness of the proof are secondary to the “continuing desire for human
understanding of a proof” (p.2). In his paper, Thurston goes on to argue that
mathematicians should attend more to “the communication of insights (p.8,
emphasis in original ), and he proposes that this can in part be accomplished
by a younger generation of mathematicians who “reinject diverse modes of
thought in mathematics” and to “invent names and hit on unifying definitions
that replace technical circumlocutions and give good handles for insights”
(p.7). And here Thurston shifts consideration from the question of why to
the question of how to attend, which is the subject of the next section.
Before proceeding though, it is worth considering whether Thurston’s answer
implicates the aesthetic at all. Todd might argue that it rests squarely in
the epistemic, since it is about knowledge. However, given the affective
tone of Thurston’s message and the focus on “insight,” which involves nonpropositional forms of understanding, I do see an aesthetic dimension to his
response related to the quality of the understanding itself.
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2.2. HOW do mathematicians attend?
There are many ways of addressing the question of how mathematicians
attend. One, which focuses on the methodological, would consider the process by which mathematicians devise and prove theorems. Lakatos’ work,
in his Proofs and Refutations [27], is an investigation of how mathematicians attend describing as it does the methods (such as monster-barring and
concept-stretching) by which theorems, proofs and definitions evolve over
time to become sanctioned mathematical products. Although Lakatos has
been criticised for the quasi-empirical philosophy he advances in the book,
his description and identification of methods stand as rather robust and, indeed, given the rarity of his project as a whole, they have yet to be seriously
challenged. More recently, Borwein and Bailey [6] extend Lakatos’ project to
include the experimental dimension of mathematics made so important by
the advent of digital technologies. In their Mathematics by experiment: plausible reasoning in the 21st century, the computer is central to an experimental
methodology as a way “to generate understanding and insight; to generate
and confirm or confront conjectures; and generally to make the mathematics
more tangible, lively and fun for both the professional researcher and the
novice” (p.vii).
The growing use of the computer in mathematics offers an unusually
public and persuasive opportunity to examine the nature of the methods
and means used to conduct mathematics research. In some senses the experimental methods that are characteristic of computer use in mathematics
may have long been a part of mathematical practice, as noted by Borwein
and Bailey [6], who point to mathematicians such as Euler and Gauss as
examples. But the use of computers to prove the Four Colour conjecture
is somewhat different, and has generated an enormous amount of discussion
around what counts as a proof in mathematics and, more importantly, what
methods can be sanctioned in the community for arriving at those proofs.
Over the past decades, in addition to computer-generated proofs, computeraided reasoning and computer-driven theorem-proving, the computer is being used to find new proofs for existing theorems (thus occupying the sacred
ground of creativity and aesthetic satisfaction described in the Gauss quotation above) as well as generating proofs or disproofs of open questions.
These latter developments challenge the traditional symbolic method of deduction that has long dominated the mathematics community. It is rather
evident that such changes in method will result in changes to the discipline
itself (including what problems can be posed and solved) but, drawing on
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a materially-framed historical account of mathematics, Brian Rotman [44]
argues that in changing what the mathematician can do with the dynamic
imagery and haptic interaction of digital technologies – which is very different
from what they can do on paper with symbols – the computer will change
the nature and constitution of the mathematician. The computer can be
thought of as insisting that the mathematician attend to the visual and the
kinesthetic presentations and re-presentations of mathematical behaviour.
The reader is undoubtedly aware of these computer-related developments
in mathematics, but my point here is to argue that the question of which
methods a particular mathematician might use or whether such methods are
sanctioned in the community is indeed an aesthetic one. When confined to
the individual level, it may be brushed off as a personal preference or style,
but, in cases such as computational methods, the shift might be compared
to the move from painting to photography, where the question of how to
capture reality challenges deep-seated values that implicate ontological and
epistemological assumptions as well. In the case of mathematics, the issue of
machinic presence continues to challenge the community, as evidenced by the
involvement of the computer in the proof of the Four Colour Theorem more
than two decades ago and the more recent Kepler sphere-packing conjecture.
In terms of the former, the original Appel and Haken computer-based
proof in 1976, which generated much discussion (see, for example, [21, 22]),
was later improved and revised by Robertson, Sanders, Seymour and Thomas
in 1996. Although their method required checking about one-third of the
maps that the Appel-Haken proof needed to be checked, making it more
efficient, it also involved a more efficient algorithm. The computer is left to
undertake the work that could, in theory, be done by hand, but that is much
more practical to do by machine. The level of trust that mathematicians
have in the result is evidenced by its foundational role in graph theory, where
many results depend on the Four Colour conjecture being true. In terms of
method then, the evolution of the proof shows a tendency toward shifting
the trivial, repetitive procedures to the computer and the more conceptual,
intuitive work to the mathematician.
This can be seen clearly when comparing the proof of the Four Colour
conjecture with that of the Kepler sphere-packing conjecture, recently communicated by Hales. In this proof, the computer does not simply get put to
work on a discrete and finite number of computations; instead it must take
on much more complex operations involving continuously changing variables
in high dimensional non-convex spaces. In a very unusual editorial comment,
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the Annals of Mathematics stated that there were portions of the proof that
its reviewers would not be able to check, despite extensive work and effort
over four years, and that the reviewers were only 99% certain that it is correct ([20, 50]). Part of the challenge around verification relates to issues
around the allocation of computer memory (not knowing a priori how much
to allocate) and to numerical precision – the decisions and interpretations
required by the mathematician increased the entanglement between human
and computer logic. In contrast with the Four Colour Theorem proof, which
could technically be done by hand, this proof could not. Hales has launched
the Flyspeck project, which aims to create a computer-based automatic verification of every step of the proof, essentially reducing, once again, the role
of the computer to trivial, repetitive work that could be checked by hand.
In other words, in Pickering’s [36] terms, mathematicians do not wish to
accord any agency to the computer (or to any material objects). According
to Rotman’s perspective, such a position ignores the fact that “mathematics
has been engaged in a two-way co-evolutionary traffic with machines since
its inception” (p.58), citing the way in which machines such as the wheeland-axle have given rise to abstract mathematical concepts such as cyclicity
and angular motion. If mathematicians have been able to pretend that these
machines have always been mere disposable tools, Rotman argues that the
digital computer will make such claims increasingly unrealistic and will force
the mathematician to recognize the agency of the computer and its effect
on the very way she thinks. With Poincaré’s insistence on the ego, on “le
moi” of mathematical invention, I suspect that the sharing of agency will be
a deeply divisive process.
The publication of the sphere-packing proof in the Annals did not contain
any of the computer code or printout that were used by Hales to achieve his
results; these were published elsewhere in a computer science journal. The
way in which the work was published provides insight into the question of how
mathematical results are communicated and, more particularly, how mathematical texts are written. Not surprisingly, even before the sphere-packing
proof, the use of the computer in mathematics has occasioned breaches in
the conventional style of mathematical writing. Consider these words of advice proffered by Ewing’s [13] editorial for The Mathematical Intelligencer,
which first established the aesthetic considerations involved in the reporting of mathematical results: “Like scientists, we should continue to perform
experiments, by any means available. But like artists, sculptors, and composers, we must exercise judgment about what should be placed on public
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display” (p.4).
Ewing is responding to the “growing tendency to breach customary etiquette” in mathematical reports (both written and in speech) in which computations done by the computer are described. Reporting on techniques
used in an experiment is essential for a scientist but not, asserts Ewing,
for a mathematician, who must instead wade through false starts, mistakes
and revisions toward a “polished product, the correct statement with a clear
proof.” To elucidate his preferred style, Ewing cites von Neumann “if the
deductions are lengthy or complicated, there should be some simple, general
principle involved, which “explains” the complications and detours, reduces
the apparent arbitrariness to a few simple guiding motivations” [54, p.196].
Ewing elaborates on his aversion to the profusion of computer-generated calculations: “if such work had been done “by hand,” no one would have dared
to discuss it in public.” He is not alone; in A Manual for Authors of Mathematical Papers [1] even more direct advice is given: “Omit any computation
which is routine (i.e., does not depend on unexpected tricks). Merely indicate
the starting point, describe the procedure, and state the outcome.” (p.2)
In addition to the theme of computation, Ewing’s sense of mathematical
style opts for the clean and polished. In How to Write Mathematics [16],
Halmos adds to cleanliness a desire for efficiency and cumulativeness.
The discoverer of an idea, who may of course be the same as
its expositor, stumbled on it helter-skelter, inefficiently, almost
at random. If there were no way to trim, to consolidate, and to
rearrange the discovery, every student would have to recapitulate
it, there would be no advantage to be gained from standing on
the shoulders of giants. (p.23)
Omitting calculations, detours, and false starts in order to gain clarity, simplicity and efficiency, which will enable the discipline to move forward: this
is the modern mathematical style. In the A Manual for Authors of Mathematical Papers [1], we find further elaboration of how this can be achieved:
It is good research practice to analyze an argument by breaking
it into a succession of lemmas, each stated with maximum generality. It is usually bad practice to try to publish such an analysis,
since it is likely to be long and un-interesting. The reader wants
to see the path – not examine it with a microscope. (p.2)
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Once again, the reader is unlikely to find these stylistic dictates surprising. But just because they seem natural and expected, it does not mean
that they are somehow immanent or that they are a necessarily by-product
of mathematical practice. Indeed, one can easily appreciate the contingency
of the contemporary style by comparing it with historical writings of mathematicians as diverse as Cavalieri, Descartes, Gauss and Hamilton. To make
the point convincingly though, I’d like to draw on the recent work of Reviel Netz [34], who offers a detailed examination of the mathematical writing
style of a group of Ancient Greek mathematicians. In his book Ludic Proof:
Greek Mathematics and the Alexandrian Aesthetic, Netz argues that written
mathematics in the time of Archimedes (from about 250 to 150 BC) had a
distinct style that differed markedly from both that of other Ancient Greek
periods (including that of Euclid) as well as that of contemporary writing.
Before proceeding, since I am going to compare the Alexandrian style
with the contemporary one, it is important to point out that Archimedes
communicated his mathematical through personal letters, and not through
journal articles. One may argue that the mode of communication marks
the essential difference between the two styles I want to compare. Nowadays, mathematicians are also permitted to communicate through letters (or
emails) and their style of writing in these cases differs drastically from that
of their more formal writing. However, I think it is still worth comparing
the two styles in part because it may suggest ways in which the academic
journal medium affects the style of communication and in part because in
the Alexandrian letters actually communicate complete results through theorems and proofs that have a strong family resemblance to the current form
of mathematical communication.
The elements that Netz proposes – and that are markedly different than
the style proffered by Ewing – are as follows: narrative surprise, mosaic
structure and generic experiment, and a certain “carnivalesque” atmosphere
(Netz borrows this colourful adjective from Bakhtin (as cited in [34]), for
whom carnivalesque describes a literary mode in which humour and chaos
are used to subvert and liberate assumptions associated with a dominant
style). These elements are manifest in Netz’s reading of Archimedes’ Spiral
Lines, which is devoted to the proof that the area under the segment of the
spiral equals one-third the area of the corresponding circular sector. One
might note the surprising fact that the ratio between two curvilinear areas
is an integer one, which might impel one to call the result beautiful. But
Netz is less concerned with evaluating the result in terms of its aesthetic
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qualities than he is in analysing the particular style in which Archimedes
relays the result. Some of these stylistic elements, as Netz points out, are
circumscribed by the fact that Archimedes offers his results in the form of a
letter, so that his writing has a very specified audience than do contemporary
mathematicians.
Narrative surprise can be seen in the very introduction to the problem,
which arises abruptly after Archimedes has already discussed two other problems in such a way that the reader expects these to be the central work
undertaken in the letter. When he finally does talk about the spiral, he introduces it as “a special kind of problem, having nothing in common with
those mentioned above” (p.3). Netz shows that the abrupt transition evident in the beginning of the letter is characteristic of the Archimedian style,
and reoccurs through the letter, even as the proofs are given. The “special”
character of the problem is also suggestive of the particularly exotic flavour
of the writing. Archimedes then swiftly and clearly (unlike his elaboration of
the previous propositions, which are dense and opaque) achieves his second
goal in Proposition 18 to show that a certain straight line defined by a spiral
is found to be equal to a circumference of a circle. Then, after introducing
a new conceptual tool in Proposition 21 (without explaining its function),
Archimedes reaches Proposition 24, where, as Netz writes “the treatise as a
whole makes sense” and the enunciation of the result is given “in economic,
crystal-clear terms – the first simple, non-mystifying enunciation we have had
for a long while” (p.10). The meaning of the previous propositions finally
comes to light.
Other aspects of the Archimedean style highlighted by Netz relate to the
way in which proofs are sequenced in the text. For example, Archimedes
does not elaborate the proofs according to the set of goals he establishes at
the beginning, and he doesn’t even define the spiral until halfway through
the treatise. Before getting there, we have a “surprising sequence going from
physics through abstract, general geometrical observations, via the geometry of circles and tangents, and finally, leading on to a sui generis study
of arithmo-geometry – none of these being relevant to any of the others”
(p.9). Netz sees the extensive use of calculations and of physics (the spiral
requires the motion of two lines) as a breaking of genre-boundaries and the
ungoverned sequence of seemingly unrelated material as leading to a style of
surprise and mosaic structure that contrasts greatly with the linear axiomatic
presentation found in contemporary mathematics. In addition, in contemporary mathematics, efforts are made to signpost the general structure of
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the argument so that the reader knows how different tools – and, especially,
different lemmas – will be used. This pedagogical style seems completely
absent in the Archimedean treatise.
If Netz’s discussion of style (in terms of mathematical writing) fits squarely
into the category of how to attend, it also relates to other aesthetic considerations of the why and the what. For example, Netz believes that Archimedes
intentionally chose an obscure and “jumpy” presentation so as to “inspire a
reader with the shocking delight of discovery, in Proposition 24, how things
fit together; so as to have them stumble, with a gasp, into the final, very
rich results of Proposition 27” (p.14). The Archimedean writing style might
thus be described less in terms of being in pursuit of the true or the good, as
being designed to produce a highly satisfying emotional reaction – much in
the same way we except a good poem or play to do. Further, Netz points to
the way in which we can attend to this Archimedean treatise in terms of the
what, namely, the novel and somewhat exotic focus on the spiral, which he
is the first to study, and which involves boundary crossings not customary in
Euclidean geometry, where time and motion are strictly forbidden (see [37]).
In these stylistic elements – and Netz provides an extensive number of
examples of mathematical writing by Archimedes and his contemporaries – a
mathematical style emerges that contrasts markedly with the contemporary
one. I have already hinted at some of the differences, but it would be misleading to neglect one difference that Netz elaborates at length, namely, the
way in which Archimedes’ mathematical writing style was influenced by, and
in turn influenced, the Hellenistic literary style in poetry. It would be difficult to make a similar kind of argument today (unless one wants to consider
the works of groups such as Oulipo), but in articulating the central tensions
of both literary and mathematical cultures, Netz provides insight in the way
in which a common style might have been possible in the past – and, indeed,
might be possible in the future.
Literature brings together diversity and unity: the tension between diversity and unity is thus a constant of literary history.
Mathematics brings together certainty and surprise: the tension
between certainty and surprise is thus a constant of mathematical
history. Some literary cultures emphasize diversity, others emphasize unity. Some mathematical cultures emphasize certainty,
other emphasize surprise. (p.235).
I have drawn on Netz’s work substantially, because it stands as a unique
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example of a historical study of aesthetic considerations in mathematical
writing. Further, it contrasts significantly with the style evident in contemporary mathematics. If the modern mathematician wants a clear path
organized in bite-sized lemmas, Archimedes and his contemporaries maximize detours, withhold information about direction and purpose, and refuse
to bury (or elucidate) numerical results. While Netz calls the modern style
pedagogical, presumably in its intent to inform and clarify, one could also
argue that, in hiding and omitting, it does little to develop mathematical understanding. Indeed, Henderson and Taimina [19] explain how contemporary
published papers may do little to satisfy questions such as “Why is it true?”,
“Where did it come from?”, “How did you see it?” These questions indicate
a search for perspicuity and meaning. Thurston reports a similar experience
in which his logically correct, tasteful proofs established results but blocked
meaning amongst his colleagues. The “ludic” style does not seem geared
toward this type of intuition-bearing communication, either. However, it
may in fact be more insightful in the sense of being less deceptive. If the
modern mathematician must deceive to produce clean theorems (pretending
the results were clearly, sequentially attained – perhaps even always true),
the “ludic” mathematician at least refuses to erase himself or his audience:
surprised must be designed with a reader in mind.
2.3. WHAT do mathematicians attend to?
As evidenced by the work of Andrew Wiles on Fermat’s Last Theorem,
problems (and especially ones that have stood unsolved for so long) form
a central locus of attention in mathematics. Historically, the construction
problems related to the Delian oracle can be seen as shaping to a large extent
the word of geometry. Netz [33] provides an astute and revealing account
of the central and generative role played in the history of mathematics by
this problem of Archimedes: how do you cut a sphere, with a plane going
through one of the latitude lines, so that the volume of the bigger part
has a certain given ratio to the volume of the smaller part. Originally a
geometric problem, solved in various ways over the course of the centuries
through to Late Antiquity, the problem is turned into an algebraic equation
by Omar Khayyam in the Middle Ages. Netz thus traces out a transitioning
mathematical practice from a focus on problems toward a focus on systematic
approaches, which, in modern mathematics, becomes a practice focused on
theories and theorems.
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The practice of mathematics based on problems persists though: one
could argue that during the last four hundred years of the previous millennium, the problems that focused mathematical work were ones put to mathematics from the natural sciences. For example, the problem of describing
the motion of a string fixed at one end and swinging at the other, which
emerged from the study of mechanical systems, gave rise to d’Alembert’s
work in differential equations and eigentheory (see [18]). With Hilbert’s famous twenty-three “problems,” offered in 1900, which has a strong influence
on the subsequent development of mathematics, one finds a mixture of open
problems in the style of Classical Greek mathematics (such as the 18th: Kepler Conjecture and the 8th: Riemann hypothesis) while others focus more
on a theory-driven approach (such as the 6th: Axiomatize all of physics or
the 15th: Provide a rigorous foundation of Schubert’s enumerative calculus).
And much more recently, the creation of the Clay Institute’s Millennium
Prize problems in 2000 shows how open problems in mathematics are an organizing principle for the growth of the discipline. Why such focus on open
problems?
The proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem provides some insight into the centrality of problems in mathematics. Commentators on Wiles’ tremendous
achievement suggest that its importance relates not only to the fact that the
theorem had remained unproved for so long, despite its misleading simplicity, but to the extensive, and unanticipated and deep connections it forged
between different areas of mathematics. Mathematicians have talked about
liking problems that are simply stated but surprisingly deep or complex, using Goldbach’s conjecture as a paradigmatic example (see [47]). And this
is certainly true of Fermat’s Last Theorem, though the full weight of complexities would not become apparent until Wiles had toiled for seven years
inventing new techniques and bringing together previously distinct areas of
mathematics.
That problems are attended to in mathematics, that they take such a
central role in shaping the discipline, has an aesthetic dimension. But this
leads to the question of why certain problems are worth attending to. Here
we come to what Tymoczko [55] sees as the crux of the aesthetic function
in mathematics: of the infinitely many true propositions one could state in
mathematics, only a very few attract attention. Unlike physics, there is no
reality against which mathematical truths must be measured: the choice is
wide open. Indeed, this freedom of choice incites many mathematicians to
draw parallels between the arts and mathematics as disciplines (see [49]).
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But it may be more important to note that just as in the arts, where certain
themes draw repeated attention (the nude figure, the vase of flowers, the
meaning of love, death, sorrow, the multiplicity of perspective), mathematicians operate in a historically mediated community where certain problems
are worth coming back to. Further, as in the proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem, open problems in mathematics have a tendency to be both generative
and unifying; they lead to new techniques and ideas while also developing
connections between previously distinct fields.
I will not attempt to be comprehensive in considering the what question,
but I would like to consider a rather different, and perhaps more subtle
example that Rotman [44] alludes to in his discussion of the effect of digital
technologies in mathematical practice. In particular, he examines the wellknown P=NP question, which concerns the extent to which a problem (like
the Travelling Salesman Problem) can be solved in a feasible number of
computational steps, and which can be framed as follows: if one can verify
a possible solution to a given problem in polynomial time, can one also find
a solution to that problem in polynomial time? The use of polynomial time
as the measure of feasibility of finding a solution is an arbitrary one (the
question could be posed in terms of any measure of time), but one that is
consistent with the mathematician’s attention to the theoretical as well as
the infinitistic. Rotman points to a different approach to the P=NP question
that attends much more to the pragmatic concerns of the computer scientist
(who is interested in the actual run-time of a decision process). In contrast
with the mathematician’s asymptotic definition of polynomial functions being
“smaller than” exponential ones, Rotman argues for an alternative framing
of run-time that focuses attention on the finite world of physical reality which
is necessarily bounded.
The mathematical approach to the question of feasibility thus belies a
deep commitment to infinity as an object of attention (and, of course, following on Gattegno’s frequent observation that “mathematics is shot through
with infinity,” one could say the same thing about most problems and questions in mathematics, both contemporary and historical). But Rotman also
argues that a different mathematical framework for thinking about feasibility would “entail overcoming a large and difficult obstacle: how to effect a
conceptual escape from the great attraction of the classical integers” (p.75).
The fact that the integers are treated as idealized objects whose existence
are “given” and “true” may seem obvious and inescapable, but one can appreciate the contingency of these objects of (great) attention by questioning
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the extent to which such numbers really are “natural” and whether there
may be alternative understandings of counting (as does [43]). My goal here
is not so much to settle the best approach to the P=NP question but, rather,
to use Rotman’s problematising of the mathematical approach to point to
the way that constructs such as infinity and natural numbers are not the
given elements of mathematics but, rather, the ones chosen (at this time) for
further processing and inferencing.
One last comment on mathematical objects is worth making: a large
amount of mathematical activity is devoted to creating and proving the existence of objects. In fact, the question of how to attend in mathematics
involves incessant transformations of processes into objects (counting turns
into a number, dividing two numbers turns into a ratio, approaching a value
turns into a limit, mapping inputs to outputs turns into a function). That
the object becomes the ultimate focus of attention is worth signaling, especially since an object is almost always the detemporalized, demobilized, and
even dehumanized (in the sense that processes must be carried out by someone, but objects can carry on idealized existences) culmination of a process.
Where Rotman emphasizes the prevalence of the infinite in mathematics, one
can also point to the prevalence of the static in mathematicsto the tendency
of attending to objects one can hold still.3 But as Pimm [37] points out,
since mathematical objects have no physical reality, intermediary symbols
(whether written or drawn) become the objects of mathematical practice:
In the absence of a “true” object, like a cuckoo’s egg hatching
in a nest, they subvert, supplant and replace, becoming instead
the object of attention. In each instance, consequently, both the
algebraic letter and the geometric diagram then revert to being
icons in the traditional, religious sense: that is, to recall GrahamDixon’s words, “signposts to the next world, placed in this one”.
(p.181).
3

Tahta [51] develops a more psychodynamic perspective on the relation between mathematics and its objects in terms of psychological need humans have to have, hold, keep
and fetishise objects. He cites the mathematician Philip Maher [29] who observes: “If we
accept the view that one’s mathematical reality is an instantiation of one’s potential space
that occurs when one is doing mathematics then the objects in this psychological space
– the mathematical objects one plays with [...] – function as transitional objects. From
this perspective there is little psychological difference between, say, a teddy bear and a
self-adjoint operator [...]” (p.137).
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Pimm considers the roles of both the algebraic letter and the geometric diagram in the practice of mathematics, particularly in terms of their changing
status as objects of attention. The problematic status of the diagram in the
Bourbaki tradition, compared with its central cognitive role for the Ancient
Greeks (for whom the diagram – and not the text – was the mathematical
object, see [32]), exemplifies well the contingent nature of the mathematical
object, and its relation to historically-sensitive values and preferences.
In this section, I have been trying to draw attention to the objects of
mathematical attention. In arguing that these objects involve choices, preferences and values – and that they change over time and context – I have
pointed to the specific aesthetic considerations they entail. These kinds of
aesthetic considerations are prevalent and public in the world of art criticism,
which make these statements – what to attend to, how to attend and why
attend – function as real questions in this domain, questions of empirical nature and interpretative responses. In the next section I would like to consider
briefly the question of why such statements may strike many as obvious or
epiphenomenal parts of the mathematical discourse.
3. Aesthetics, criticism and audience
In an essay in White’s volume [58], Tymoczko [55] explores the “possibility of regarding some of [mathematics’] products as objects of aesthetic
enjoyment” (p.67). Following the lead of Borel [4], Tymoczko attempts to
engage in aesthetic criticism about these products, trying to show that it
is not just its relation to science that provides mathematics its source of
value judgments. Tymoczko’s interest in criticism is initially inspired by the
conviction that mathematics is an art (see [48] on the development of this
tradition), but is also driven by a perceived
need to ground value judgments in mathematics [...] those positive judgments like important, elegance, relevance, promise) and
those negative judgments (like in consequentiality, triviality, crudity, sterility) that are necessary to characterize a discipline and
to shape its progress. (p.68)
He argues that one component of this need relates to an issue I have already mentioned, namely, the fact that selection is necessary in a discipline
where not only are there infinitely many true results, but where thousands
of new theorems are proved every year, and only a handful needing to be
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passed on. Mathematicians need to make this choice. A second component
– on which he spends far less time – relates to the way in which aesthetic
criticism might help shape mathematics by providing, like it does in the arts,
constraints and directions for the disciplines development. Of course, if Tymoczko is right, then this sort of criticism must be taking place already (if
only in the decisions made by referees and journal editors). A good art critic,
he writes, draws our attention to certain features of the work, provides us
with a way of seeing or hearing the work, so as to enhance our appreciation.
When he uses “us” here, he refers to the audience of the work – but who
might that audience be in mathematics? Is there an audience for mathematical criticism? If not, artist, audience and critic are doomed to a closed,
incestuous set of people, rendering criticism superfluous (see also [38] for further discussion of the audience of mathematics). There is little distinction
between the audience (those how do/make/write) and the critics (those who
watch/ingest/read).
The criticism that Tymoczko advocates does happen, albeit in a covert
and private form, as I mentioned before, in the context of academic publication and granting agencies. Reviewers and editors make the decisions
about what will get published in books and in journals, and this influences
the problems and fields that receive attention amongst mathematicians and
their students, which shapes the courses given at the graduate level, and
eventually also at the undergraduate level (see [59] for a discussion of how
this very process led to a near disappearance of geometry in the curriculum of the latter part of the twentieth century). Such a system might be
frustrating for young mathematicians, if they are not properly enculturated
by mentors. But it can lead to important problems in the discipline itself,
illustrated through the story of Thurston, who writes about the harm he did
to a whole branch of mathematics – and to his colleagues – by moving so
quickly towards results that eclipsed comprehension. Thurston was left to
act as his own critic, first realizing that his work was inaccessible to everyone,
and then engaging in the critical work of finding ways to help his colleagues
understand and appreciate his techniques and results.
As stated in the introduction, White’s vision of humanistic mathematics
called for an understanding of the value judgments implied in the growth of
any discipline. This vision, I believe, explicitly acknowledges the historical,
cultural and material contingencies of mathematics, as well as the subjective and social dimensions of mathematical practice. My exploration of the
aesthetic considerations in mathematics aimed to focus attention on the dif-
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ferent kinds of value judgments – often only tacitly made or practiced –
that animate mathematics practice in terms of what is investigated, how it
is investigated, or why it is investigated. By pointing to specific examples
of the way in which value judgments steer and frame the discipline, I have
tried to move the notion of the mathematical aesthetic beyond appraisals of
beauty or elegance, and around questions of whether aesthetic claims have
epistemic value. The recent work of historians, philosophers and sociologists,
whom I have quoted in this paper, contributes in important ways to illuminating and explaining the changing practices and values of the mathematical
community. Increased critical work in this direction will provide even more
insight into the present state of mathematics as well as suggest possibilities
for a future mathematics that can be less covert in its positioning toward
non-mathematicians.
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